

omy, based not on a colonial policy of exploitation but on a democratic policy of joint endeavor and self-improvement," the future ambassador said.

On a far larger scale in the last 5 years of his life, colonial problems the world over concerned Stevenson, who moved in the center of storms of Communist oppression, border wars, crises without end. In his role as spokesman for the United States before the United Nations, Stevenson carried—in the words of President Johnson—America's most eloquent spirit, its finest voice.

Communism, in the view of this spokesman for the West, was nothing more than organized terror. "It is without spiritual content or comfort. It provides no basic security." His articulate voice was stilled today on a London street, his life ended in a London hospital. His spirit belongs to America's future.

ADLAI STEVENSON AND THE WORLD OF THE SIXTIES

In attempting to eulogize Adlai Stevenson one encounters an obstacle created by Stevenson himself. He was the most compelling American orator of the generation, perhaps the century. Any words said for him seem insufficient.

To some, the brilliant use of language will remain his only achievement. This would be enough. Language is but a vehicle by which we convey thought. If his speech was brilliant and compelling, so was his mind. He held an audience with the substance of his message, not his showmanship.

But Stevenson, by fate more than design, did more to shape the 1960's than any other living American.

For nearly a decade he served as the leader of the liberal political movement in this Nation. It was a movement that sought to attack what seemed unassailable—the slums of the city, white-and-blacks-onlys of the South, the humiliation of the hospital charity ward. It attacked a rich nation for perpetuating poverty and individual inequity.

He led a movement that recognized the revolt of oppressed peoples all over the globe. A movement that believed that assistance to a new black African nation or an old Asian colony was both a gesture of human charity and an investment in the security of the United States.

In other words, for nearly a decade, Adlai Stevenson was the leader, the chief spokesman, the prime innovator and idol for a political movement that came to power with the election of 1960. A political movement that now commands both the Presidency and both Houses of Congress.

John F. Kennedy did not create this movement. He captured it. He both rode and led it to power. It drew its force, its basic motivating ideas, its sense of purpose from Adlai Stevenson.

He was the pivotal wellspring around which proposals and personalities surfaced.

Perhaps his work in the United Nations and achievements as Governor of Illinois will be remembered.

But if any one American molded the America of the 60's it was Adlai Stevenson. This is his achievement. It is even more impressive when one considers that he held no elective office during the period.

The Nation did not elect him as its leader. But it is following his lead—J.R.

See On Ribicoff
THE BASIS FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, on June 26, 1965, the Washington Evening Star published an excellent article by Max Freedman entitled "Four Principles for Peace in Vietnam."

I believe this article is an excellent background for understanding why we

are there and what we are faced with in Vietnam today. I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FOUR PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

(By Max Freedman)

In the report on Vietnam that Secretary of State Dean Rusk presented to the American Foreign Service Association there is a clear statement of the terms on which the war can be ended. These principles are laid down by the Government of South Vietnam and are endorsed by Rusk on behalf of the Johnson administration. They do not seek to impose a settlement on the Communists. They are not alibis for more bombing. They are a clear and constructive statement of the principles which can lead to an honorable settlement. Within these principles the actual process of diplomatic bargaining can proceed so that a settlement can be reached on a basis of agreed and mutual concessions.

On June 22 the Foreign Minister of South Vietnam set forth the fundamental principles for a "just and enduring peace." They are:

1. An end to aggression and subversion.
2. Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny "in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources."
3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the Government of South Vietnam and the nations that have come to its aid to defend South Vietnam, and the removal of foreign military forces from South Vietnam.
4. Effective guarantees for the independence and freedom for the people of South Vietnam.

After quoting these declarations of policy, Rusk went on to say:

"These are fundamental steps. When they are carried out, we can look forward, as we have stated previously, to the day when relations between North Vietnam and South Vietnam can be worked out by peaceable means. And this would include the question of a free decision by the peoples of North and South Vietnam on the question of reunification. This forthright and simple program meets the hopes of all and attacks the interests of none. It would replace the threat of conquest by the hope of free and peaceful choice."

Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that North Vietnam will accept these terms even as a basis for discussion. North Vietnam already has rejected the overtures of peace proposed by Secretary General U Thant for the United Nations; by the 17 nonaligned nations; by Prime Minister Shastri of India; by Britain on numerous occasions and by Canada without publicity. Now it is extremely suspicious of the British Commonwealth's mission for peace.

This bleak record does not include the contemptuous rejection by North Vietnam of all offers by the United States to explore the prospects for a peaceful settlement. The evidence is overwhelming that North Vietnam is counting on a victory for aggression and has therefore widened and intensified the war. But it is essential to the American position that the whole world should know that the United States, and even as it resists aggression, is working for peace and wants North as well as South Korea to share in the development program for southeast Asia proposed in April by President Johnson in his Baltimore speech.

Rusk explained that the suspension of bombing attacks in May was made known to the Communists in advance through diplomatic channels to see if there would be a response in kind. Hanoi denounced this ef-

fort for peace as a "wornout trick" and Peiping called it a "swindle."

Now it is being said that the pause was too short since it lasted for only a few days. To these critics Rusk replied that "the harsh reactions of the other side were fully known before the attacks were resumed. And I would also recall that we held our hand for more than 4 years while tens of thousands of armed men invaded the south and every attempt at peaceful settlement failed."

It is worth some emphasis, too, that Rusk defended the air raids as having achieved no more and no less than had been intended when the attacks began. No one in a position of power in the Johnson administration ever thought that the bombing attacks by themselves would bring North Vietnam to the conference table. But they have imposed heavy strains on North Vietnam; interrupted its lines of supply; raised the contingent threat of wider bombings; and placed both North Vietnam and Communist China under urgent notice that no sanctuary on the model of the Korean war would be tolerated. All this had been done on the direct instructions of Johnson in ways that have kept the loss of life to the absolute minimum possible in the cruel necessities of war.

In defiance of logic and its self-interest, North Vietnam is intensifying its aggressions while China is becoming steadily more threatening. But Rusk surely spoke for the Nation when he said, "The American people want neither rashness nor surrender. They want firmness and restraint. They expect courage and care. They threaten no one. And they are not moved by threats of others."

SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISIONS OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE ON H.R. 6675, THE SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1965

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, as chairman of the Senate conferees of the House-Senate committee on H.R. 6675, I am happy to announce the decisions of the conference committee on H.R. 6675, the Social Security Amendments of 1965, a summary of which I set forth herewith. It is expected that the conference report will be filed by midnight of Monday, July 26, and will be available in printed form on Tuesday, July 27.

A summary of the major decisions of the conference committee follows:

BASIC HOSPITAL INSURANCE PLAN

Benefit duration: House provided 60 days of hospital care after a deductible of \$40 currently. Senate provided unlimited duration but with a \$10 coinsurance for each day in excess of 60. Conference provided 60 days with House bill deductible—\$40 currently—and with an additional 30 days with the Senate's \$10 coinsurance feature.

Posthospital extended care—skilled nursing home: House provided 20 days of such care with 2 additional days for each unused hospital day but a maximum of 100 days. Senate provided 100 days but imposed a \$5 a day coinsurance for each day in excess of 20. Conference adopted Senate version.

Posthospital home-health visits: House authorized 100 visits after hospitalization. Senate increased the number of visits to 175 and deleted requirements of hospitalization. Conference adopted House version.

Outpatient diagnostic services: House imposed a \$20 deductible with this amount creditable against an inpatient hospital deductible which was imposed at the same hospital within 20 days. Senate imposed a 20-percent coinsurance on such services, removed the credit against the inpatient hospital deductible but allowed a credit for the deductible as an incurred expense under the voluntary supplementary program—for deductible and reimbursement purposes. Conference adopted Senate version.

Psychiatric facilities: House provided for 60 days of psychiatric hospital care with a 180-day lifetime limit in the voluntary supplementary program. Senate moved these services over into basic hospital insurance program and increased the lifetime limit to 210 days. Conference accepted the Senate version but reduced the lifetime limit to 190 days.

House excluded any extended care facility primary for the care and treatment of mental diseases or tuberculosis. Senate included such facilities but made both psychiatric extended care days and psychiatric hospital days subject to the lifetime limitation of days of care. Conference continued the House exclusion.

Christian Science services: House covered Christian Science sanatoria under hospital services—60 days with \$40 deductible. Senate added coverage for extended care and visiting nurse services. Under the conference agreement, Christian Science services will be covered as follows: Christian Science sanatoria services, 60 days with \$40 deductible plus 30 additional days at \$10 coinsurance per day, as hospital service; plus an additional 30 days in a Christian Science sanatorium as extended care facility services with a \$5 per day coinsurance feature.

Scope of services, specialists: House excluded M.D. services in the field of pathology, radiology, physiatry, or anesthesiology from basic hospital insurance benefit—but provided for their payment under supplementary medical insurance program. Senate included these services if billed through a hospital. Conference accepted House version.

Emergency services for areas immediately bordering the United States: Senate provided hospital services in border areas immediately outside the United States where comparable services are not as accessible in the United States for a beneficiary who becomes ill in this country. Conference adopted Senate amendment.

Interns: House included, under inpatient hospital services, the services of medical interns and residents under approved training programs. Senate extended this provision to dental interns and residents in hospitals under approved training programs. Conference accepted Senate addition.

Drugs: House limited drugs to certain standard drug formularies and to those approved by hospital pharmacy and drug therapeutics committees. Senate added the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia to the list of formularies and added a provision to include combination drugs

if their principal ingredient is listed in one of the formularies. Conference accepted the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia provision but did not accept the Senate's combination drug provision.

Eligibility of aliens under transitional provision for the uninsured: House specified that such aliens must have 10 years of residence prior to filing of application. Senate added a requirement of permanent residence but reduced residence requirement to 6 months before application. Conference increased the residence requirement to 5 years and retained requirement of permanent residence.

Federal employees, under transitional provision for the uninsured: House excluded all persons who had been eligible under the Federal Employee's Health Benefits Act of 1959—FEHBA—if they, or some other individual, had had the opportunity to enroll under that program. Senate excluded only those who are actually covered under FEHBA. Conference limited the scope of the Senate provision so that individuals who retired before February 16, 1965, and were not covered then under FEHBA will be eligible.

Railroad retirement employees: House bill taxed railroad workers and their employers directly under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act with major administrative duties to be handled by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Senate put financing feature under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and Railroad Retirement account, and with primary responsibility for administration under the Railroad Retirement Board. Conference agreement provided that taxes would be collected under the railroad system but paid into the hospital insurance trust fund. Railroad Retirement Board would determine eligibility but the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would reimburse providers—except Canadian hospitals. Like the Senate amendment the conference approach would be effective only if the railroad retirement taxable wage base is equivalent to the Federal hospital insurance tax earnings base—but, unlike the Senate amendment, such equivalence would be a continuing requirement which, if not met, would mean the system would revert to the approach provided in the House bill.

Appeals: House limited appeal to a hearing examiner and judicial review to claims of \$1,000 or more. Senate reduced this amount to \$100. Conference provided that for claims from \$100 to \$1,000 there would be hearing examiner review but no judicial review. For claims above \$1,000 there would be both.

State standard for institutions: Conference accepted (with technical amendment) Senate amendment relating to higher State standards than those necessary for hospital accreditation.

Conference rejected following amendments added by the Senate:

Providing for a comprehensive study and report, with recommendations, on extended care facilities and nursing home care.

Making certain requirements for use of State agencies in certification of facilities.

Relating to transfer agreement between facilities in different States.

Requiring personal notice to health care beneficiaries of benefit rights.

SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE

Effective date: House effective date July 1, 1966. Senate effective date January 1, 1967. Conference accepted House version.

Medical services: House bill limited to physicians. Senate bill extended program to dentists performing certain dental surgeon functions and to chiropractors and podiatrists. Conference adopted dental surgeon's services but rejected those of podiatrists and chiropractors.

Eligibility of aliens: House made aliens ineligible unless admitted for permanent residence. Senate added a requirement of 10 years of residence. Conference reduced requirement to 5 years of residence and made any individual eligible if he was eligible for social security.

Drug study: Senate authorized a study of the feasibility of extending the program to prescribed drugs. Conference rejected this provision.

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE—NEW TITLE XIX

Administering agency: House required that the single State agency administering the medical assistance program must be the agency administering title I or XVI—the welfare agency. Senate provided that any single State agency may be chosen by the State to administer the program providing the agency administering title I or XVI be used to determine eligibility. Conference adopted Senate version.

Future termination of existing medical vendor programs: House required that all existing medical programs in the five titles of the Social Security Act would be terminated on June 30, 1967. Senate gave States the option of continuing under existing law or under new programs. Conference would terminate existing programs on December 31, 1969.

Kerr-Mills for children: House provided that dependent children and specified relatives caring for them under the age of 21 could be included even though they did not meet requirements for need and age under the State plans for aid to families with dependent children, but were otherwise qualified. Senate included all individuals under 21 and adults caring for them. Conference adopted Senate provision as to the coverage of children under 21 but accepted House provision as to coverage of the adult caretakers.

Dental services for children: House made dental services for children under 21 optional. Senate made them mandatory. Conference accepted House version.

State participation in non-Federal share: House provided that there must be only State participation in non-Federal share of matching by July 1, 1970. Senate provided an alternative under which local funds could be used after that date with certain safeguards. Conference adopted the Senate version.

Rejected Senate amendments: First, imposing Federal standards as to fire and safety on participating institutions;

the Appropriations Committees of the Congress having any opportunity to study the financial aspects of programs and activities proposed from time to time and no opportunity to scrutinize the efficiency and wisdom with which moneys are spent in support thereof.

The Federal payment, under the pending legislation, would be automatic, based upon the formula set forth in the bill, and is estimated to amount to \$71 million by 1970.

I am also advised that the city's aggregate debt, including debt owed to the U.S. Treasury, can reach a limit of \$586 million by 1970, a figure so high, in my judgment, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make full repayments under it.

Moreover, there is the very real possibility that a future Congress would legislate to reduce the amount of Federal payment to the District. Supporters of the legislation before us may not consider this to be a serious possibility, but the present Congress cannot bind succeeding Congresses, and should elected city officials be of a different political faith from that of the majority in Congress on some future day, one may very well see my prognostications materialize.

So, as to the financial aspects of the legislation before us, it is my sincere and considered opinion that the Congress will make a grave mistake if it enacts legislation which takes from the Appropriations Committees of the two Houses all authority, supervision, and jurisdiction over the spending programs of the Federal city and which delegates to elected city fathers the authority to what really amounts to the appropriation of Federal moneys, in the form of a Federal payment, for the operation and administration of the city's government.

Secondly, as I indicated earlier, I am opposed to this bill because I believe that, this being the Federal city, it should remain under complete Federal control. I have already stated that 9 million tourists from all over the country visit this city annually, and the number is increasing. These citizens visit the Federal city because it is the Nation's Capital, and all citizens should be encouraged to visit the Capital at some time during their lives. While they are here, they should have the protection of a police department that is not demoralized and under the control of city officials who would be influenced by pressure groups which have, in the past, raised charges of police brutality when the charges could not be substantiated. Moreover, time after time, in recent months, we have read press accounts of citizens who have walked away from the scene of a crime without giving any assistance whatsoever to the victim and who have not shown the good judgment and upright civic responsibility to even notify the police.

Mr. President, the Washington Evening Star on June 27, 1965, published an article by Miriam Ottenberg, entitled "How Area Residents Can Reduce Burglary." I read an extract therefrom:

Last week on Capitol Hill, for instance, burglars struck the same house twice within 24 hours. They were seen hauling away a

stereo set during the day. Late that night, they were heard dragging out a heavy object which turned out to be a 12-foot refrigerator. Although the owner was known to be absent and police would have had plenty of time to catch the burglars with the refrigerator, nobody called police.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TIPS FROM POLICE—HOW AREA RESIDENTS CAN
REDUCE BURGLARY

(By Miriam Ottenberg)

Every homeowner and housewife can help reduce the vast number of housebreakings in the Washington area by following certain procedures to make them the eyes and ears of the police.

That is the consensus of ranking police officials trying to cope with housebreakings already running well ahead of last year's Washington record of a burglary every 56 minutes.

They base their urgent appeal for public cooperation on these factors:

Washington police are now solving less than a third of the housebreakings for lack of evidence. They recover less than 10 percent of the housebreaking loot.

Without an accurate description of the burglar or a timely call to police, detectives don't know where to start hunting. As long as they're stymied, the burglars are free to ply their trade.

BURGLARIES DOWN IN AREA

Burglaries have decreased, however, in the sections of the seventh and eighth precincts where neighbors have banded together to watch out for suspicious strangers and to alert police. Apparently the word is out among professional burglars to shun areas protected by the well-publicized "chain of watching eyes."

Although this neighborly mutual help pays dividends in fewer burglaries, police in other parts of the city cite case after case where housebreakers could have been trapped if a neighbor had bothered to call police.

Last week on Capitol Hill, for instance, burglars struck the same house twice within 24 hours. They were seen hauling away a stereo set during the day. Late that night, they were heard dragging out a heavy object which turned out to be a 12-foot refrigerator. Although the owner was known to be absent and police would have had plenty of time to catch the burglars with the refrigerator, nobody called police.

SUSPICIOUS SITUATIONS

Police analysis of the methods of operation of the typical housebreaker shows when a householder's suspicions should be aroused and what action should be taken.

1. If a stranger knocks at your front door and asks for Mr. Smith or wants to sell you a magazine subscription or offers to trim your lawn, take the time to jot down this information: When he called, what he wore, his race, approximate age and what he said.

It takes only 30 seconds to scribble a note like this: "At 2:05 p.m., a white man about 48, poorly dressed, green overalls, came to the front door and asked if he could cut the grass."

Your visitor probably had a legitimate mission but he could have been knocking on your door to see if the coast was clear for housebreaking. Your note would be a memory refresher if police later asked you if a stranger had come to your door that afternoon—possibly the man who looted a house down the street.

ODD-JOB SEEKERS SUSPECT

2. If somebody you've never seen before comes up on your back porch and says he's

a friend of your maid or asks if he can do odd jobs for you, don't hesitate. Call the police.

In suburban areas particularly, would-be housebreakers start at the back of the house where they're more apt to be screened by shrubbery. If nobody answers the back door knock, the burglar can go to work.

Usually, handymen are known in a neighborhood. If you don't recognize this odd-job seeker or never heard of his friend the maid, the police want to know his identity. Don't think police are annoyed by such calls. Your call might solve a housebreaking or prevent one.

3. If you live in a section where few cars are parked on the street during the day, make a note of the strange car in front of the house next door. The color and make of the car are helpful but what police need most is the license number and the home State.

4. If you see a stranger at your neighbor's front door, watch him for a few minutes. In Washington, burglars enter most often by the front door. If he goes in the house, do not assume he has been admitted. He can jimmy a lock in less than a minute. Call the police or at least make a note.

5. If he emerges a short time later with a bulging suitcase or a television set, do not assume he is a visiting relative or a television repairman. Some crooks take only cash and guns. Others, however, also take jewelry, clothing, and any appliance they can carry.

6. Do not be misled by a taxicab coming to pick up the stranger. Some burglars calmly call a cab to haul away the loot after they finish burglarizing the house.

7. If you see anything out of the ordinary, any situation that does not fit, do not ignore it. The stranger walking down the alley may be looking for an open garage door, from which to use the rear entrance to a house. The stranger leaning against a lamp-post across the street could be a lookout man for his confederate inside the house. Most burglars operate in teams. Jot down what you see or call the police. Your house could be the burglar's next target.

APARTMENTS HIT MOST OFTEN

Nowadays, apartments are entered much more frequently than private homes, but so far this year, more than 850 residences in Washington have been the target of housebreakers.

The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports reflect that its sheer illusion to think the suburbs around Washington are free of housebreakers. The rate of housebreakings is going up much more sharply in surrounding Maryland and Virginia than in the District.

The housebreaking rate in the District increased by one and a half times between 1958 and 1964. But FBI compilation of police figures shows that the housebreaking rate tripled in Montgomery County, quadrupled in Prince Georges County, doubled in Arlington, and tripled in Fairfax. Only Alexandria showed a less sharp increase.

In the suburbs as in the city, police can use the help of householders to fight the housebreakers.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, this is but one of many stories which I could cite for the RECORD to indicate, as I have already stated, a laxity, a great unwillingness, and reluctance on the part of the citizens of the community to go to the aid of a victim, or to report incidents to the police or to offer themselves as witnesses to a crime.

The circumstances being what they are, I am confident that control of the police department by elected city officials in the District of Columbia would result in a demoralization of the police department, and diminish protection for the citizens, both white and Negro, of the

July 21, 1965

District, and for the millions of Americans who annually visit this great city as sightseers and tourists. Additionally, the people of the country have to come to the District of Columbia to conduct much of their business. Lawyers must appear in courts and Federal agencies in this city, physicians and scientists attend research activities, conventions meet here, diplomats and representatives of foreign governments come here and live here, the presence of Governors and other States officials is required here from time to time, and the presence of Senators and Representatives and their families and staffs is also required here. If we are to provide police protection—uncontrolled by machine politics and uninfluenced by pressure groups—to the millions of Americans and to people from other countries who come to this city, the police department in the District of Columbia must not be placed under the control of elected city officials as would be the case if the bill before us were enacted into law.

I could develop my thesis further, but I shall not do so except to say, in closing, that this legislation, which provides for the popular election of a Board of Education, would, in my opinion, very likely result in the downgrading of education in the District of Columbia. One has only to recall the recent and continuing attacks on the track system to fully understand that the enactment of this bill would inevitably result in the domination of the educational programs within the District of Columbia by pressure groups which, in many instances, appear to be guided by emotions rather than by experience, training, and a full consideration and knowledge of the facts involved.

I certainly want to pay my tribute to the distinguished Chairman of the District of Columbia Committee, the able and congenial senior Senator from the State of Nevada. I do not envy his task, but I do have a very high regard for the service which he always performs in his difficult assignment. I did not seek the chairmanship which I now hold, and I am sure that he has not sought the chairmanship which is now his, but we both view these assignments as responsibilities and duties which we, as Senators, must carry, along with many other responsibilities equally onerous. I hold only the highest personal esteem for the Senator from Nevada, who has made a very fine presentation in behalf of the bill. I share many of the thoughts and viewpoints that have been expressed by him and others who support the bill, but I have reached a different conclusion. I know that the committee on the District of Columbia has toiled long and patiently in the development of this legislation, and I have waged no battle against the bill, but I believe that the viewpoint which I have expressed today in opposition to the legislation, albeit not a popular viewpoint, is one which carries with it the weight of difficult experience gained over a period of 5 years in dealing with some of the toughest financial problems of the District of Columbia. I, therefore, felt that I should express this viewpoint,

hoping, indeed that my comments might be of some benefit to my colleagues in this body and in the other body. I recognize that many of the citizens of the District of Columbia will differ with me, and I probably will be criticized by some, as I have been criticized a thousand times in the past. Nevertheless, I have stated my deep and honest convictions on the subject of home rule. I believe I am right in my opposition to this bill and justified in the reasons I have expressed. I shall, as I have stated, vote against it on final passage, realizing that this body will pass the bill. I love this Capital of our country, as we all love it, but I do not believe that the enactment of this measure will be in its best interests or in the best interests of the people of the area and the Nation.

I yield the floor.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum—

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold that request?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be recognized without the Senator from Wisconsin losing the right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO 11 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. First, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business tonight, it stand in adjournment until 11 tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Fe 22 Mans.
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the situation in Viet Nam, in the words of President Johnson, Secretary McNamara and others, is likely to get worse before it gets better. What the Secretary will report to the President as a result of his week in Viet Nam is, of course, not known; but it appears that the groundwork has been laid for a further intensification of the military effort in Viet Nam. Obviously, if this continues the American presence is going to assume the predominant role in that conflict.

There is talk of a reserve call up, extended enlistments, added defense appropriations and the like. It is even anticipated on our side that the war may go on for 4 or 5 or even 10 years and Ho Chi Minh, President of North Viet Nam, has stated in the last day or so that he is prepared for a war of 20 years duration.

It is interesting to note and not surprising that what is occurring in Viet Nam is now being called "an American war" by one columnist and another columnist states that in South Viet Nam: "It is real war there at last."

The President has gone down many tracks in an effort to enter into "unconditional discussions" to pave the way

for negotiations which might end the hostilities in Viet Nam. He has met with silence or rebuffs at every turn. U Thant has endeavored in a quiet way to use the facilities of the United Nations. A proposed Commonwealth Group which would go to Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and Washington has been advocated and rebuffed. A representative of the British Government has gone to Hanoi. Mr. Mr. Harriman has gone to Moscow; all with no success.

It is my understanding that in the immediate past Ho Chi Minh has extended an invitation to President Nkrumah of Ghana to come to Hanoi but instead of Mr. Nkrumah going, he is sending Ghana's High Commissioner in London. A glimmer but only a glimmer of hope may come out of this meeting.

It is of interest, I think, to the American people to note the comments of General Nguyen Cao Ky, the present premier of South Viet Nam—one of a long line—in a recent TV program with Walter Cronkite. I do not have the complete copy of the interview but I am inserting at the conclusion of my remarks an article by one of the most competent foreign policy analysts in the nation, Mr. R. H. Shackford of the Washington Daily News.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that be allowed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. It does not make very reassuring reading. And if there is any complacency on the part of any American, it ought to be dispelled by an exposure to Premier Ky's comments.

What I have stated are grim facts. What the situation in Viet Nam confronts us with, however, is a grim fact. It is better to face up to this problem than to ignore it in the belief that it will wash away at the end of the monsoons. The time for wishful thinking is past; the time for accepting the reality is now. Indeed it has been time for quite awhile. We are in, not for a summer of pain and difficulty but for an ordeal of indefinite duration and increasing sacrifice which will persist until the problem can be resolved at the Conference table.

Our policies so far have been mostly in the nature of holding operations, except for forays of our bombers over Viet Nam. The air raids have apparently failed to stop the infiltration of regular and irregular North Vietnamese units into South Viet Nam but instead, in my opinion, have hardened the position of the government and the people of the North and increased their commitment to this war. As evidence thereof, the estimates of the number of active armed Viet Cong has risen sharply since the beginning of the year, despite their reported severe losses.

As the war in Viet Nam increases in tempo, we should keep in mind the possibilities of Communist pressure against us in other parts of Asia and perhaps other parts of the world. I have in mind the uneasy truce which exists in Korea; the possibility of operations against Thailand and Laos and elsewhere.

At the moment the Soviet Union is furnishing a certain amount of assistance. The Chinese are providing some material aid to North Viet Nam although to the best of our knowledge no Chinese personnel have as yet entered the conflict. But if the war continues to escalate, Peking, Moscow and Hanoi will continue to be drawn more closely together despite any ideological or other differences which at the present time may exist.

As I see it, the chief beneficiary of what is going on in Southeast Asia at the present time is Mainland China. The Chinese are benefiting from events there at little cost and with little sweat. Chinese governments have long been adept at exercising the virtue of patience which they have in abundance. They can wait and wait and wait for events to develop to their interest.

During the past 10 or 11 years I have as one Senator, made a number of suggestions to our government as to what might or might not be done to stabilize the situation in South Viet Nam, in all Viet Nam, and also in Cambodia and Laos. The possibilities of further initiatives for peace become slimmer by the day, even as the alternatives become more restricted by the hour.

I would like to suggest once again, therefore, that the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1961, that is the Soviet Union and Great Britain, jointly reconvene the conference for the purpose of discussing the affairs of Laos, Cambodia, South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam to the end that all reasonable and honorable possibilities of peace and integrated economic reconstruction and development in the area may be investigated.

If it is not possible to call a conference covering all of the nations of Indochina, then I would suggest again that the two co-chairmen reconvene the Geneva Conference along the lines requested by Prince Norodom Sihanouk for the purpose of considering ways and means by which the Geneva signatories may at least guarantee Cambodia's independence and territorial integrity and this matter only. If Cambodia can be insulated from the growing conflict, that, in itself, would be a highly significant achievement for peace in Indo-China and Southeast Asia.

But I must say in all frankness, at this time, that a conference based on the consideration of the entire question and called by the co-chairmen would appear to me to be a more desirable alternative. I want to be clear, however, that if such a conference is not possible or feasible at this time, then I believe it is still desirable that a conference on Cambodia alone under the authority of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1961 should be called.

There has long been a desire for such a conference on the part of Prince Sihanouk. He made his position on this question very clear some weeks ago in a letter to the New York Times and I ask unanimous consent that its text may be included at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit No. 2.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, today, there are reports on the news ticker that Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos has urged Britain to arrange a reconvening of the Geneva conference. In this connection I ask unanimous consent that the report referred to also be printed at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, finally, I would suggest that if there is reluctance or reservations or inability on the part of one of the cochairmen of the Geneva grouping of 1961, then in view of the gravity of the situation, the other would appear to me to be eminently justified in issuing the call for a reconvening of the conference on its own. The Geneva agreement of 1961 clearly provides for consultations when there are difficulties. It would, therefore, be entirely in order, in the light of the great difficulties at this time, for any participating nation, and particularly, one of the cochairmen to issue the call. I do not see how any State which recognizes the urgent necessity for peace and has eyes to see where the present course in Vietnam is tending, can refuse to heed to call for a meeting of this kind. But in any event, there would still be some opportunity for the others to make a contribution to the restoration of peace if the conference is convened.

Perhaps the hour is late, but the old saying "better late than never" applies here and it applies with the greatest of force.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE] for his patience and consideration in yielding to me.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, July 20, 1965]

GENERAL KY WANTS TO "REORGANIZE THE REAR": WINNING VIETNAM WAR IS GOING TO BE GI'S JOB

(By R. H. Shackford)

It is becoming more obvious each day that if the war in Vietnam is to be won—or even brought to a stalemate—American GI's are going to have to do the bulk of the job.

Each day brings further evidence that the South Vietnamese are in a bad way, militarily and politically. The unthinkable of a few months ago—Vietnam becoming an American war—is now routinely accepted here.

South Vietnamese Premier Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky has virtually admitted that the Americans will have to play a bigger and bigger role in the war if it is to go on.

He is the same man who talks with bravado about "liberating" North Vietnam while conceding that he cannot "liberate" the south.

General Ky is the flamboyant, high living chief of the Vietnamese Air Force who, for a month, has been the latest of a long line of unsuccessful Premiers.

He appeared over the weekend on a nationwide U.S. television show and gave some disturbing information about the status of his country.

First, General Ky conceded that the people of South Vietnam are "indifferent" about the war. Many, he admitted, will not participate in the war effort because they are disgusted with the continuous changes in government in Saigon and, thus, have no confidence in any government.

Second, he promised more confusion among the Vietnamese military and govern-

ment hierarchy by promising another thorough purge of both.

This would be the umpteenth "purge" in the last 2 years—the Vietcong gaining ground on each one.

Third, more American GI's are needed, he said, so that the bulk of the South Vietnamese Army could "reorganize the rear." He suggested that U.S. troops hold "the perimeter"—apparently meaning do the fighting against the Vietcong.

The Ky TV interview was broadcast in the United States while Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was in Vietnam, receiving appeals from General Ky and U.S. military officials there for more American ground forces.

Mr. McNamara's Saigon trip appeared primarily to be a well-staged operation for preparing the American people for more bad news—because the decision to send more American troops to Vietnam was made long before Mr. McNamara left the United States last week.

The United States now has more than 75,000 uniformed men in Vietnam, plus another 20,000 off the shores of that country with the 7th Fleet.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are understood to have recommended that the United States plan to have 179,000 men on the ground in Vietnam by the end of the year.

General Ky came closer to disclosing the dire outlook in Vietnam than any U.S. official.

President Johnson has said the situation will get worse before it gets better. But no U.S. official has even hinted, as General Ky did, that the war is so close to becoming overwhelmingly an American war.

The Vietnamese manpower situation long has been deficient. For years there have been brave promises of major recruiting and conscripting—but each campaign has fallen short of goals.

The South Vietnamese Military Establishment usually is said to total 550,000 men. Less frequently it is explained that only 250,000 of those are Regular Army soldiers, the rest being various paramilitary units ranging all the way down to policemen.

The "numbers game" on the Vietcong goes on. Last week they were said to have 65,000 regulars, supported by 80,000 to 100,000 irregulars or part-time guerrillas.

U.S. officials claim that the rate of infiltration from the north, including Regular North Vietnamese Army units, has increased rapidly in recent months. Major "search and kill" operations, however, have failed so far to flush any large enemy groups from the jungles.

In justifying the huge increase of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam and the plans for more, the United States emphasizes primarily the larger numbers invading from the north.

General Ky was the first to indicate—however indirectly—that another major reason for needing more GI's is the disintegration in the south.

EXHIBIT 2

SIHANOUK DISCUSSES CAMBODIAN CONFERENCE
To the EDITOR:

In your May 6 editorial (internal edition May 7) you analyze the reasons which impelled Cambodia to sever diplomatic relations with the United States.

You write that this decision stemmed from my convictions that I could avoid vassalage to China, by paying occasional "political tribute." A little further you say that I try to avoid Chinese interference in my country by making concessions to China in foreign affairs.

You attribute to me sentiments, that are not at all mine, and thus you create an unfortunate confusion in the minds of your readers.

Last month I wrote in the monthly review Kambuja published in Phnompenh. I have never had the slightest illusion on the fate that awaits me at the hands of the Commu-

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nists, as well as that which is reserved for my government, after having removed from our region the influence and especially the presence of the free world, and the United States in particular.

In an editorial which will appear shortly in this same review, I concede again that after the disappearance of the United States from our region and the victory of the Communist camp, I myself and the people's Socialist community that I have created would inevitably disappear from the scene.

I know the Chinese well enough to understand that they cannot be bought and that it is perfectly useless to bend before them, or to play their game occasionally in the hope of extracting some ulterior advantage. If I acted thus, I would be despised, and rightly so, by the Chinese people, who would not alter their plans one iota so far as my country is concerned.

But there is one thing that you Americans seem incapable of understanding. And that is that Cambodia has broken off with the United States of America not because it is a "pawn of Peiping," as you write, but for reasons of dignity and national honor that we have ** placed on Cambodia, you display obvious spite in saying that the fault is mine and that because I allow myself to be "maneuvered by Peiping," the meeting may not take place.

As for the prospect of an international conference taking place on Cambodia, you let it be known that the fault lies with me because I allow myself "to be run by Peiping," that the meeting will not take place.

But then you immediately point out that this conference was intended "in part to provide a way for exploratory conversations on Vietnam." And this is repeated and emulated by all press of the free world. We Cambodians have come to the conclusion that the neutrality of Cambodia and our territorial integrity do not concern you at all and that this conference is simply, in your eyes, a good way to sound out the ultimate intentions of the Vietnamese and the Chinese in regard to South Vietnam and that you will link our problem to that of Vietnam, by refusing to give any guarantee whatever to Cambodia if the Communists remain insistent on Vietnam.

The People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have stated clearly their determination not to accept the government of Saigon as partner in an international meeting.

We, ourselves, are well aware that the government of Saigon has lost control of almost four-fifths of the Vietnamese border with Cambodia, and we are also aware of the fact that Saigon persists in claiming the coastal Khmères Islands, while the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and Hanoi acknowledge our ownership.

Nevertheless—and in an effort to arrive at a solution in such a difficult context—I advised the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who had sent me on May 11 an urgent message, that Cambodia would accept the conference on two conditions:

First of all, that the conference should concern itself with the Cambodian problem to the exclusion of the Vietnamese or Laotian problem. Then, that the interested powers: Great Britain, U.S.S.R., the United States, France, and the People's Republic of China, should agree in advance on a solution which would satisfy all, on the problem of the representation of South Vietnam.

I pointed out to Mr. Wilson that there were four possibilities: (1) that South Vietnam should not be represented at the conference; (2) or should be represented by the National Liberation Front; (3) or be represented by the Government of Saigon; (4) or finally be represented bilaterally: one seat to the NLF, which is supported by the Socialist camp, and another seat to the Gov-

ernment of Saigon, which is backed by the free world.

I informed the British Prime Minister that Cambodia stands ready in advance to accept whatever solution regarding the representation of South Vietnam would be mutually approved by the great powers of the East and the West.

This will prove to you, I hope, that we are not the puppets of Peiping and that we do not put "spokes in any wheels" in order to defeat a project that the United States has put so long on "ice" and which now they discover has so many merits.

NORODOM SIHANOUK,
Head of State of Cambodia.
PNOMPEHN, May 16, 1965.

EXHIBIT 3

LONDON.—Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos urged Prime Minister Harold Wilson today to help arrange new international talks on Indochina to negotiate for peace in Vietnam.

The neutralist Laotian leader, here on a 2-day official visit, met Wilson and other British Ministers at lunch in 10 Downing Street.

Diplomats reported Souvanna stressed that so long as the Vietnam war goes on the security of nearby Laos and Cambodia will remain in jeopardy.

North Vietnamese supply lines to the Vietcong in the south run through Laotian territory controlled by the Red-led Pathet Lao. This has attracted U.S. bomber attacks on Laotian territory bordering South Vietnam.

Informants said Souvanna, noting the failure of all efforts to date to bring about a Vietnam peace parley, suggested the British and Soviet cochairmen reconvene the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. This dealt with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in separate settlements. Souvanna, who conferred in Paris yesterday with President Charles de Gaulle, claimed French backing for his idea.

Wilson and Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart were sympathetic to Souvanna's suggestion but were doubtful whether it would prove to be effective, the sources said.

DEAN RUSK, A GREAT SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. PROXIMIRE. Mr. President, at a White House press conference a few days ago, President Johnson was asked whether he contemplated a change in the office of Secretary of State. He replied:

None whatever. I think you do a great damage and great disservice to one of the most able and most competent and most dedicated men I have ever known, Secretary Rusk. He sits to my right in the Cabinet room. He ranks first in the Cabinet and he ranks first with me.

This was an apt way of calling attention to the fact that we have as our present Secretary of State a man of rare ability, dedication, and character who brings true distinction to that highest of offices within our Cabinet.

The position now occupied by Dean Rusk is perhaps the most demanding next to the Presidency itself. As the study by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations—chaired by the able Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON]—phrased it:

A Secretary of State's duties are extremely heavy.

That study, part of the fine series on administration of national security,

identified a number of responsibilities of the Secretary of State. Dean Rusk merits high marks for his performance in all of them.

The study calls attention to the Secretary's role as senior personal adviser to the President, both in private talks and at working sessions of the President's inner councils.

The President has often indicated how much he values Dean Rusk's advice in the innermost foreign policy councils of our Government. And understandably so, for our present Secretary brings to that responsibility a wealth of experience and training.

He was a brilliant student and, I am told, a very able basketball player, when, as a young man, he attended Davidson College in North Carolina. He attended Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar and while there gave promise of his future profession by writing an essay which won the Cecil Peace Prize, an important university award. After a short period of college teaching he served with great distinction during World War II, primarily in the area of Burma, which gave him firsthand knowledge of a part of the world that has taken on increasing importance during his years as Secretary.

He joined the State Department after the war and rose rapidly to positions of high responsibility. In 1946-47 he served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, and in 1947, at the request of Secretary of State George C. Marshall rejoined the Department of State as Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, which later became the Office of United Nations Affairs. In 1949 he became the first Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs. In May 1949 he was appointed Deputy Under Secretary of State, and in March 1950 Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

Many of us who are relatively new in Washington lose sight of the fact that Dean Rusk gained this superb and firsthand experience in the State Department years ago, at a time when the State Department was operating under considerable stress.

The Jackson subcommittee study also notes the important role of the Secretary of State as "our ranking diplomat in dealing with foreign governments. As such he stands at the intersection of affairs: advocate of American policies to other governments, and official channel of suggestions and protests about American policies from other governments."

Dean Rusk excels as our ranking diplomat. As Secretary of State he has represented the United States at meetings of the NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and ANZUS treaty organizations, participated in meetings of the Organization of American States and the United States-Japan and United States-Canadian Economic Committees, and signed the limited nuclear test ban treaty in Moscow. He has met with the Foreign Ministers of nearly all of the 113 members of the United Nations. He accompanied President Kennedy on several of his official visits abroad and has participated in a number of President Johnson's meetings with foreign government leaders.